ModSecurity (Core Rules) HTTP Parameter Pollution Filter Bypass Vulnerability Jun 11 2009 07:11PM
lavakumar kuppan (lavakumar in gmail com)

  ModSecurity (Core Rules) HPP Filter Bypass Vulnerability

  Affected Software : ModSecurity <= 2.5.9 using ModSecurity Core
Rules <= 2.5-1.6.1
  Author                 : Lavakumar Kuppan - lavakumar[dot]in[at]gmail[dot]com
  Advisory URL       : http://www.lavakumar.com
  Severity               : High
  Local/Remote       : Remote

  [Vulnerability Details]

  Modsecurity is an Open source Web Application firewall which runs as an Apache
  module. It has a comprehensive set of rules called 'ModSecurity Core
Rules' for common web application
  attacks like SQL Injection, Cross-Site Scripting etc.

  It is possible to bypass the ModSecurity Core Rules due to the
difference in behaviour
  of ModSecurity and ASP/ASP.NET applications in handling duplicate
  parameters. Using duplicate parameters has been termed as HTTP
Parameter Pollution by Luca Carettoni
  and Stefano Di Paola.

  When multiple GET/POST/Cookie parameters of the same name are passed
in the HTTP request
  to ASP and ASP.NET applications they are treated as an array collection.
  This leads to the values being concatenated with a comma inbetween them.

  For example when the following query is sent to the server:
  POST /index.aspx?a=1&a=2
  Host: www.example.com
  Cookie: a=5; a=6
  Content-Length: 7


  The server side interpretation of this data is as follows:

  Request.Params["a"]        --> "1,2,3,4,5,6" ( if "a" was registered
as a server-side control ) (ASP.NET Only)
  Request.Params["a"]        --> "1,2,5,6" ( if "a" was not registered
as a server-side control ) (ASP.NET Only)
  Request.QueryString["a"] --> "1,2" (ASP and ASP.NET)
  Request.Form["a"]       --> "3,4" (ASP and ASP.NET)

  This behaviour is unique to ASP and ASP.NET applications and
ModSecurity does not interpret this data in the
  same way. When dealt with multiple parameters of the same name
ModSecurity matches the value of each instance
  of the parameter seperately against its rule base. Incase of the
above example ModSecurity would run '1' against
  the rule set first then '2' and so on till '6'.

  Since data is interpreted differently by the Web Application and the
Firewall this produces intresting possibilities
  for a filter bypass scenario.

  This theory was tested against the SQL Injection rule base of
ModSecurity Core Rules and was found to bypass the
  default-enabled rule set successfully.

  The following request is blocked by ModSecurity as this matches its
Generic SQL Injection Attack rule.

   http://example.com/search.aspx?value=select 1,2,3 from table

  ModSecurity Interpretation:
   value = select 1,2,3 from table
  Web Application Interpretation:
   value = select 1,2,3 from table

  However the same payload can be sent to the server by splitting it
using duplicate parameters like below.

   http://example.com/search.aspx?value=select 1&value=2,3 from table

  ModSecurity Interpretation:
   value = select 1
   value = 2,3 from table
  Web Application Interpretation:
   value select 1,2,3 from table

  The attack can be made more flexible by using the inline comment
feature in MS SQL servers.


  ModSecurity Interpretation:
  Web Application Interpretation:
   value = select/*,*/1,2,3/*,*/from/*,*/table

  This technique could possibly be extended to exploit other types of
Web Application vulnerabilities as well.

  Refer the whitepaper 'Split and Join' (see references) for more
details on this attack.

  [Fix Information]




  [Legal Notices]

  The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the
  time of publishing based on currently available information.
  This information is provided as-is, as a free service to the community.
  There are no warranties with regard to this information.
  The author does not accept any liability for any direct,
  indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of,
  or reliance on, this information.
  Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this alert,
  provided that the content is not altered in any way, except
  reformatting, and that due credit is given.

  This vulnerability has been disclosed in accordance with the RFP
  Full-Disclosure Policy v2.0, available at:

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