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[SECURITY] [DSA 3886-1] linux security update
Jun 19 2017 03:49PM
Salvatore Bonaccorso (carnil debian org)
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Debian Security Advisory DSA-3886-1 security (at) debian (dot) org [email concealed]
https://www.debian.org/security/ Salvatore Bonaccorso
June 19, 2017 https://www.debian.org/security/faq
Package : linux
CVE ID : CVE-2017-0605 CVE-2017-7487 CVE-2017-7645 CVE-2017-7895
CVE-2017-8064 CVE-2017-8890 CVE-2017-8924 CVE-2017-8925
CVE-2017-9074 CVE-2017-9075 CVE-2017-9076 CVE-2017-9077
Several vulnerabilities have been discovered in the Linux kernel that
may lead to a privilege escalation, denial of service or information
A buffer overflow flaw was discovered in the trace subsystem.
Li Qiang reported a reference counter leak in the ipxitf_ioctl
function which may result into a use-after-free vulnerability,
triggerable when a IPX interface is configured.
Tuomas Haanpaa and Matti Kamunen from Synopsys Ltd discovered that
the NFSv2 and NFSv3 server implementations are vulnerable to an
out-of-bounds memory access issue while processing arbitrarily long
arguments sent by NFSv2/NFSv3 PRC clients, leading to a denial of
Ari Kauppi from Synopsys Ltd discovered that the NFSv2 and NFSv3
server implementations do not properly handle payload bounds
checking of WRITE requests. A remote attacker with write access to a
NFS mount can take advantage of this flaw to read chunks of
arbitrary memory from both kernel-space and user-space.
Arnd Bergmann found that the DVB-USB core misused the device
logging system, resulting in a use-after-free vulnerability, with
unknown security impact.
It was discovered that the net_csk_clone_lock() function allows a
remote attacker to cause a double free leading to a denial of
service or potentially have other impact.
Johan Hovold found that the io_ti USB serial driver could leak
sensitive information if a malicious USB device was connected.
Johan Hovold found a reference counter leak in the omninet USB
serial driver, resulting in a use-after-free vulnerability. This
can be triggered by a local user permitted to open tty devices.
Andrey Konovalov reported that the IPv6 fragmentation
implementation could read beyond the end of a packet buffer. A
local user or guest VM might be able to use this to leak sensitive
information or to cause a denial of service (crash).
Andrey Konovalov reported that the SCTP/IPv6 implementation
wrongly initialised address lists on connected sockets, resulting
in a use-after-free vulnerability, a similar issue to
CVE-2017-8890. This can be triggered by any local user.
CVE-2017-9076 / CVE-2017-9077
Cong Wang found that the TCP/IPv6 and DCCP/IPv6 implementations
wrongly initialised address lists on connected sockets, a similar
issue to CVE-2017-9075.
Andrey Konovalov reported a packet buffer overrun in the IPv6
implementation. A local user could use this for denial of service
(memory corruption; crash) and possibly for privilege escalation.
The Qualys Research Labs discovered that the size of the stack guard
page is not sufficiently large. The stack-pointer can jump over the
guard-page and moving from the stack into another memory region
without accessing the guard-page. In this case no page-fault
exception is raised and the stack extends into the other memory
region. An attacker can exploit this flaw for privilege escalation.
The default stack gap protection is set to 256 pages and can be
configured via the stack_guard_gap kernel parameter on the kernel
Further details can be found at
For the oldstable distribution (jessie), these problems have been fixed
in version 3.16.43-2+deb8u1.
For the stable distribution (stretch), these problems have been fixed in
version 4.9.30-2+deb9u1 or earlier versions before the stretch release.
We recommend that you upgrade your linux packages.
Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: https://www.debian.org/security/
Mailing list: debian-security-announce (at) lists.debian (dot) org [email concealed]
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