Published: 2006-09-14
The Diebold AccuVote-TS and TSx systems are the mostly widely deployed voting systems in the United States. The research summary and the full paper (PDF) do not mince words, clearly stating that the election machines are vulnerable to "extremely serious attacks."
The Princeton study was summarized in four main points. First, they found that malicious software, likely in the form of a virus, would be capable of "steal[ing] votes with little if any risk of attention." Second, the study concluded that anyone with physical access to a voting machine, or a memory card that would later be inserted into the machine, could easily install malicious software. Third, the Princeton researchers demonstrated a proof-of-concept virus that manipulates voting results, both on screen and in printed format, stealing votes and potentially rigging a U.S. election. They discuss how such a virus could easily be spread to numerous machines in an election riding. Finally, the paper concludes that the only feasible remedy to such major security concerns is through replacing the voting machines themselves, along with changes to electoral procedures in the U.S. - noting that software changes alone would be insufficient to patch the Diebold design flaws.
Researchers Ariel J. Feldman, Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten further provide a chilling, narrated video (including a high resolution version) that demonstrates how easy it is to fool voters and election officials with an infected machine. The narrator clearly explains how a criminal's malicious software "can steal votes, and it can cover its tracks so that the theft cannot be detected."
The researcher's video and accompanying paper show how easily a criminal could install, in advance, malicious software on a voting machine in just a few minutes. They demonstrate how voting results can be manipulated, both on-screen and on the paper printouts that verify the results. The Princeton team further discuss how a virus could spread via the system's removable memory cards, and then remove itself at the end of an election - leaving no trace of a rigged election. The actual discussion of a virus' spreading mechanism, using election officials who are unaware the voting machine is infected, can be likened to viruses in PCs that spread by floppy disks and other removable media in the 1980s.
Reports of major vulnerabilities in Diebold voting machines, which run a version of the Windows operating system, have appeared many times in the past few years. Earlier this year, Avi Rubin at John Hopkins University detailed critical flaws in the same Diebold systems. Rubin is quoted as saying about his 2006 research: "It is like the nuclear bomb for e-voting systems. It's the deal breaker. It really makes the security flaws that we found (in prior years) look trivial."
Diebold's source code for its voting software, used to run its voting machines, was also stolen in 2003 - giving criminals ample time to evaluate the program's overall architecture and construct a similar virus to what the Princeton team demonstrated.
The larger issue of how rigged voting machines could have an impact on U.S. Presidential elections, and the implications overall for American democracy and freedom, was not directly addressed by the Princeton team.
Posted by: Kelly Martin
