On 2005-02-19 10:58:23 +0100, exon wrote:
> Michael Silk wrote:
> > But wouldn't it render a login-based hashing system resistant to the
> >current hashing problems if it is implemented something like:
> >
> > --
> > result = hashFunc1( input + hashFunc1(input) + salt )
> > //
> > // instead of
> >

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The metasploit project has released two exploits for this flaw:
http://metasploit.com/projects/Framework/exploits.html#arkeia_type77_win
32
http://metasploit.com/projects/Framework/exploits.html#arkeia_type77_mac
os

The win32 exploit has targets for every version of Arkeia between 4.2 and
5.3.3. T

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===========================================================
Ubuntu Security Notice USN-84-1 February 21, 2005
squid vulnerabilities
CAN-2005-0194, CAN-2005-0446
===========================================================

A security issue affects the following Ubuntu releases:

Ubuntu 4.10 (Warty

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Anyone able to connect to TCP port 617 can gain read/write access to the
filesystem of any host running the Arkeia agent software. This appears to
be an intentional design decision on the part of the Arkeia developers. A
long-winded description of this issue, complete with screen shots,
demonstr

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Debian Security Advisory DSA 674-3 security (at) debian (dot) org [email concealed]
http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze
February 21st, 2005

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Kent Borg wrote:
> Concatenating two different hashes, for example SHA-1 and MD5,
> apparently does not add as much security as one might hope.
>
> What about more complicated compositions? For example, a reader
> comment posted on Bruce Schneier's blog
> (http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/200

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On Fri, 18 Feb 2005, Maciej Soltysiak wrote:

> Developers: Consider using checksum of the email messages, not only the
> Message-ID to distinguish between duplicated messages.

We have a product that needs to detect duplicate messages (retransmissions
in the face of temporary SMTP failu

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On this topic, I might actually say that a concatenation of two hashes
is very secure if the two hashes are sufficiently different.

Although MD5 and SHA1 are reasonably similar, let's suppose for a
moment that they use entirely different mechanisms. If this were so
and the crack time for MD5 was 2

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It does not seems to be a SQL injection vulnerability. In fact, it just
looks like a wrong replacement, but it's confined into the 'string'.

Actually the real problem is that this error, when debug mode is active,
make anyone discover the $prefix value, that should be kept secret in
case of blind s

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There are lots of other things that may need to be done to handle
dealing with duplicated message-id's as well. Note that the RFC's
mandate that the message-id is unique per message.

A number of IMAP packages use the message-id as a way of keeping
track of the message in the various folders.
Havi

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Seems to be the same vulnerability published time ago

http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/9091

On Sat, 19 Feb 2005 10:43:44 +0100, MurDoK <murdok.lnx (at) gmail (dot) com [email concealed]> wrote:
> I found a vulnerability in this cablemodem which a malicious user inside *LAN
> can reset it easily.
> This cablemodem model is gi

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On Fri, Feb 18, 2005 at 10:24:19AM -0500, Kent Borg wrote:
> Concatenating two different hashes, for example SHA-1 and MD5,
> ...

SHA and MD5 are weak algorithms [and we do not use it since now]. But
what about old digitally signed documents? There is a protocol to
re-sign our old digitally signed

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In-Reply-To: <011401c51541$fdafedb0$0400a8c0@p14n>

I think Thomas has a good point here. We must separate the academic mathematical arguement about collisions from it's application in the real world. It may be that there are collisions in both MD5 and SHA-1 but have they any actual bearing on the u

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Sadly, there is no magic bullet for the SHA-1 problem. Let me say, in
classic Bugtraq style, that I believe the "temporary workaround for this
vulnerability" is to move to SHA-512 as quickly as possible.

NIST was going to recommend SHA-256 and SHA-512 by 2010, but for the
security-conscious the ti

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I agree that an anaylsis of their results is nice and important, but
also I don't think that it will neccessarily lead to a new "perfect"
hashing function we can implement and forget about.

A nicer idea is to implement better code that allows us to modify our
internal hashing algorithms whenever we

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devnull (at) Rodents.Montreal.QC (dot) CA [email concealed] wrote:
> [As usual when I write to bugtraq, the from address in the headers
> simply discards mail, so I don't have to deal with all the broken
> autoresponder mail that would otherwise land on me. To reach me, use
> th

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Michael Silk wrote:
> Michael,
>
> But wouldn't it render a login-based hashing system resistant to the
> current hashing problems if it is implemented something like:
>
> --
> result = hashFunc1( input + hashFunc1(input) + salt )
> //
> // instead of
> //
> result = hashFunc1( input + salt

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Michael Silk wrote:
> Michael,
>
> But wouldn't it render a login-based hashing system resistant to the
> current hashing problems if it is implemented something like:
>
> --
> result = hashFunc1( input + hashFunc1(input) + salt )
<snip>

wouldn't that create an infinite loop?

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Casper.Dik (at) Sun (dot) COM [email concealed] wrote:
>>The case where N = 1 is simple authentication; the case where N = M is
>>an easily solvable problem in the scope I'm looking at. I'm interested
>>in the case where N > M and the data is encrypted.
>>
>>- Key is fragmented

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Kent Borg wrote:

>I admit I don't know why this might be significantly better than
>d1+d2, I was hoping someone here would.
>
>

I think there are a couple things going on here. First, since + is
concatenation, SHA-1(SHA-1(data)+data+MD5(data)) provides an input to
the hash that is three times

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El Vie 18 Feb 2005 11:24, Kent Borg escribió:
> Concatenating two different hashes, for example SHA-1 and MD5,
> apparently does not add as much security as one might hope.
>
> What about more complicated compositions? For example, a reader
> comment posted on Bruce Schneier's blog
> (http://www.sc

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On 17 Feb 2005 09:54:57 -0000, jtm297 (at) optonline (dot) net [email concealed]
<jtm297 (at) optonline (dot) net [email concealed]> wrote:
>
> It seems it has something to do with the the \'s *'s and length. I am not sure if this is a big bug but I decided to try that after looking at search.php

look at

function phpbb_clean_username($username)
{
$use

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[As usual when I write to bugtraq, the from address in the headers
simply discards mail, so I don't have to deal with all the broken
autoresponder mail that would otherwise land on me. To reach me, use
the address in the signature.]

> The problem is that I need a guaranteed way to create data for

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>The case where N = 1 is simple authentication; the case where N = M is
>an easily solvable problem in the scope I'm looking at. I'm interested
>in the case where N > M and the data is encrypted.
>
> - Key is fragmented
> - Fragments are indpendently encrypted
> - Each user who can authenticate ca

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/* _ ________ _____ ______
*
* cfengine rsa heap remote exploit part of PTjob project / \ / "fuck mm"
* by jsk:exworm(http://exworm.hostrocket.com) \/
* bug found by core
* yep ta mei dayong ..hehe..so pub it..
* my home: www.ph4nt0m.

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webfsd fun. opensource is god .lol windows

pst.security advisory 2005-2-20

Systems affected:
unstable webfsd 1.21
stable wenfsd 1.17.2

no affected

no..all remote exploitable

1: why advisory? this bug is found two years ago ,yea

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Findjmp is a Tiny tool originally released by Eeye, it's used to scan
call/jmp/pushret offsets.
Findjmp2 additions by Hat-Squad : pop/pop/ret scanner , logging to
file.
get sources and binary at http://class101.org/

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On Fri, 18 Feb 2005 10:31:50 +0100, Maciej Soltysiak
<maciej (at) soltysiak (dot) com [email concealed]> wrote:
> Users: Beware of the fact that automatic discarding of duplicated messages
> may result in you not getting the original mail in case someone exploits
> the effect Adrian depicted.
>
> Developers: Cons

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/* _ ________ _____ ______
*
* exwormshoucast part of PTjob project SHOUTcast v1.9.4 remote exploit / \ / "fuck mm"
* by jsk exworm (exworm.hostrocket.com) \/
* my home www.ph4nt0m.org
* bug found by pucik_at_cc-team.org
* test it

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On Fri, 18 Feb 2005, John Richard Moser wrote:

> The authentication works as below:
>
> - N users may authenticate to access the data
> - A magnitude M of authenticated users is needed to access the data
> - N >= 3 > M >= 2
>
> Are there any known ways to do this?

Google for secret sharing or secr

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