We'd like to test a disk imaging/copy device/procedure to see how it
fares if the source drive has one/more bad block errors. Is there a way,
by communicating with the hard drive, presumably at a very low level,
to convince the drive that it should mark a sector as having a
permannent error, and t

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Mr. Seward,

Because our work was funded by the US Department of Justice for the benefit
of US Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, we cannot make the
database available at no charge to US private sector companies.

However, non law enforcement entities may purchase a license to the d

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On Fri, 01 Apr 2005 14:22:29 +0100, "Paul Sanderson (Business Fax)"@sandersonforensics.co.uk said:
(cleaning up the top-posting)

> > Even worse, if the next track over is *also* out-of-spec, you can end
> > up accidentally aquiring the servo signal for the *wrong* track.
> > Whoops. ;)

> Not so

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The fundamental goal of the Steganography Analysis and Research Center
(SARC) is to collect steganography, watermarking, and other data-hiding
applications from various sources and incorporate file profiles computed
from them into the Steganography Application Fingerprint Database (SAFDB).
To date,

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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Valdis.Kletnieks (at) vt (dot) edu [email concealed] [mailto:Valdis.Kletnieks (at) vt (dot) edu [email concealed]]
> Sent: Tuesday, March 29, 2005 8:18 AM
> To: Altheide, Cory B. (IARC)
> Cc: 'Lim Ming Wei'; forensics (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]
> Subject: Re: Reality and 2.5" laptop drives, Re: Macintosh
> wiping (but why )
>

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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Lim Ming Wei [mailto:mwlim (at) pacific.net (dot) sg [email concealed]]
> Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2005 5:19 PM
> To: dave kleiman; forensics (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]
> Cc: 'gwen hastings'
> Subject: Re: Reality and 2.5" laptop drives, Re: Macintosh
> wiping (but why)
>
> Hi All,
>
> I believe t

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On a side note.....

Does anybody have specific data concerning the statistical reliability of hashes compared to DNA and fingerprinting? With references please.

Trevor O'Donnal
Network Security Analyst
Computer Forensics Investigator
Brigham Young University

________________________________

Fr

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For me, it all comes down to a few simple concepts:

1 - There is ALWAYS a chance the case could end up in court.
2 - If the case does end up in court, I will be testifying as an "expert"
3 - As an expert, I am expected to know what I am doing
4 - If the opposing attorney can make me look like I do

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From FBI testimony regarding the Moussaui investigation in 2001:

"Because SafeBack and the Logicube SFK-000A hand-held disk duplicator
have been validated by CART as computer forensic imaging tools reliably
capable of producing verifiable results, and because SafeBack and the
Logicube SFK-000A inco

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How do you say that hashing is not a unique ID for the content? Yes,
there are a finite number of possibilities for hash values. However,
are fingerprints and DNA patterns considered unique for the courts? You
bet. The probabilities involved in hashing are even stronger than DNA
and fingerprints

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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Daniel James [mailto:dajames (at) wfubmc (dot) edu [email concealed]]
> Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2005 5:34 AM
> To: gwen hastings; Christopher Blume
> Cc: Ivan Krstic; forensics (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]
> Subject: RE: Reality and 2.5" laptop drives, Re: Macintosh
> wiping (but why)
>
> In a case

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